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The Debate on Discounting: Reconciling Positivists and
Ethicists
Christian Gollier*

Abstract
Using a simple arbitrage argument,positivists claim that the interest rate provides the
rzght basis to fix the discount rate to evaluate green investmentprojects. The real interest rate
observed in the US during the twentieth century was around 1 percent. On the other band,
ethicists estimate the discount rate using the marginalrate of substitution between current and
future consumption. From classical estimations of intertemporal inequality aversion and
prudence, assuming a 2 percentgrowth rate of consumption, they recommend a discount rate of
around3.5 percent.Ethicists are therefore less prone to investingfor thefuture than positivists.
Iprovide two roads to reconcile the two approaches. First,I claim that the positivistapproach is
correct f green investment projects are financed by a reallocation of resourcesfrom productive
capital in the economy, whereas ethidsts are correct iJtheprojects arefinanced by a reduction in
current consumption. Second, I claim that ethicists should use a rate between 1 percent and 2
percent to discount sure benefits that occur in the distant future to take the uncertainoy
surroundingthefuture prosperity of the economy into account. Finally, a risk premium should
be added to the discount rate that is proportionalto the socioeconomic beta of the investment
project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In their recent book, Climate Change Justice,' Eric A. Posner and David
Weisbach argued that issues related to distributional justice should not prevent
us from pushing for effective policies to fight climate change.2 They suggested
that climate change agreements that are aimed at solving all of the world's ills
and, in particular, at redistributing wealth across nations, are doomed to fail.'
One particularly important issue is the problem of intergenerational justice,
which is associated with the discount rate. In Chapter 7 of Climate ChangeJusice,
Posner and Weisbach presented the two classical schools of thought for the
determination of the discount rate: ethicist and positivist.' The "ethicist
position" attempts to reason from basic principles about what the discount rate
should be. One of these principles is a preference for the reduction of
inequalities among successive generations. In contrast, the "positivist position"
uses the standard arbitrage argument to claim that the discount rate should equal
the interest rate observed in markets.s There is no doubt that Posner and
Weisbach are inclined to support the positivist approach: "The positivists are
correct that choosing any project that has a lower rate of return than the market
rate of return throws away resources." 6
In principle, if markets are frictionless and complete, the competitive
allocation of resources is efficient, and competitive prices provide the right
signals to agents to decentralize this allocation. Applied to credit markets, this
means that the allocation of consumption and wealth across time is efficient, and
that the interest rate should be used to discount cash flows. In particular, as

1

Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice (Princeton 2010).

2

See id at 4-5, 96-98.

3

Id.

4

Id at 149-58.

s

Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 150-53 (cited in note 1).

6

Id at 159.
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explained by Posner and Weisbach, the intertemporal rate of marginal
substitution (IRMS) of consumption today and tomorrow is equalized at
equilibrium to the real rate of return of capital, that is, to the interest rate.' In
other words, transferring consumption to the future by investing in capital has
no impact on intertemporal welfare at the margin. In this context, Posner and
Weisbach are perfectly right to claim that sacrificing current consumption to
invest in projects that have a return smaller than the interest rate reduces
intertemporal welfare and throws away resources.
However, we know that credit markets do not work particularly well. The
recent subprime crisis illustrates the various agency problems that make these
markets deeply inefficient. Moreover, recent research in behavioral economics
tends to demonstrate that human beings may have difficulty behaving rationally
relative to their consumption planning over their lifetime.' Last but not least,
credit markets are obviously incomplete, in the sense that some mutually
profitable credit contracts are not implemented at equilibrium. In particular,
because they are still to be born, future generations are unable to write
contingent contracts with current generations. These arguments imply that the
market allocation of resources over time is inefficient, and that the competitive
price of time does not provide the right signal to economic agents about saving
and investment. This fact corresponds to the so-called "risk-free rate puzzle,"
which was first documented by Philippe Weil.' The puzzle states that the
observed interest rate over the last century, which was approximately equal to 1
percent in real terms in the US, is much smaller than the IRMS, which is usually
estimated around 4 percent in real terms. This puzzle tells us that positivists
value the future much more than the ethicists, contrary to what is suggested by
Posner and Weisbach. During the twentieth century, we accumulated much
more capital than the ethicists would have recommended from their basic
principles. This accumulation of physical, human, and intellectual capital indeed
generated an extraordinarily large growth in developed countries, at the cost of
very large consumption sacrifices from our poor past generations.

7

See id at 144-47.

8

See, for example, David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discouning,112 Q J Econ 443, 449-50,
454-60, 465 (1997) (explaining that higher immediate discount rates followed by lower long-term
discount rates generate time inconsistencies by the decisionmaker, which is further exacerbated by
instant access to credit); James K. Hammitt, Positive v. NormativeJustificadonsfor Beneft-CostAnaysis
(unpublished paper, Harvard University, 2012), online at http://www.toulouse-jusice2011.fr/fullpapers/c3hammit.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2012) (providing an interesting discussion of
the complexity of cost-benefit analysis under bounded rationality, incomplete markets, and the
situation when losers cannot be compensated by winners).

9

See Philippe Weil, The Equity Premium PuZle and the Rirk-Free Rate Pugle,24 J Monetary Econ 401,
408-17 (1989).
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Over the past decade, several of my colleagues contributed to reducing the
gap between the positions of the positivists and of the ethicists. In my book,
Pricing the Planet's Future: The Economics of Discounting in an Uncertain World,' I
survey several of these attempts." Most of these attempts are linked to the role
of risk in the toolboxes of the two approaches. From the viewpoint of the
positivists, because fighting climate change has uncertain cash flows, the riskfree interest rate is not the correct benchmark return to measure the opportunity
cost of capital. Thus, adding a risk premium to the interest rate to determine the
rate at which the net benefits of fighting climate change should be discounted is
crucial. However, I do not know of any paper that provides estimations of the
socioeconomic "beta" of investment projects that reduce CO 2 emissions. From
the viewpoint of ethicists, recognizing the presence of huge long-term risks
affecting economic growth tends to reduce their estimation of the IRMS.
Prudent planners should ask for more sacrifices from current generations if
future generations bear more risk.
Overall, I believe that a consensus is not out of reach between the ethicists
and positivists, on the basis of a real discount rate for long-term investment
projects that are safe around 1.5 percent. A risk premium should be added to
this rate for projects whose future socioeconomic benefits are highly correlated
to future GDP per capita. All rates used in the following sections should be
interpreted as real rates.
In Section II, I will describe the positivist approach, switching to the
ethicist approach in Section 111. In Section IV, I compare the two approaches to
evaluate safe projects and their consequences in terms of sacrifices to be made
by current generations. Section V is devoted to the discount rate to be used to
evaluate risky projects. Section VI concludes.
II. THE POSITIVIST APPROACH
Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton computed the annualized return on bonds
and equities for different countries during the twentieth century.12 Using
extended data from the same authors from 1900-2006, the main facts are
summarized in Table 1. In the US, the real return on Treasury Bills, which
mature in one year or less and are probably the safest assets in the world, was
10

Christian Gollier, Pricing the Planet's Future: The Economics of Discounting in an Uncertain World
(Princeton 2012).

11

See, for example, Martin L. Weitzman, Subjective Expectations and Asset-Return PuZyles, 97 Am Econ
Rev 1102 (2007); Martin L. Weitzman, Why the Far-DistantFuture Should Be Discounted at Its Lowest
Possible Rate, 36 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 201 (1998).
Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global
Investment Returns (Princeton 2002).

12
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around 1 percent. On the other hand, ten-year Treasury bonds delivered an
average real return of 1.9 percent, and equities delivered one of 6.6 percent. The
real return of these three asset classes varied significantly across different
countries during the period of the study. In particular, the real return of fixed
income assets was negative in some countries, including Japan, France, and Italy,
where World Wars occurred. 3 Observe also that the equity premium varies
across countries within the range of 3 percent to 7 percent. The same exercise
was also repeated over the shorter time period of 1971-2006. It is notable that
the safe return on government bonds was much larger during this period than
over the century as a whole, whereas the return on equities remained stable. A
possible explanation for this is the successful fight against inflation by central
banks in recent years, a move that markets took time to understand before
updating their beliefs.
Government Bills
aturi <1 year)
1900-2006 1971-2006

Government Bonds
(maturity= 10 years)
1900-2006

1971-2006

1900-2006 1971-2006

Australia

0.6%

2.5%

1.3%

2.8%

7.8%

6.3%

Canada

1.6%

2.7%

2.0%

4.5%

6.3%

5.8%

Denmark

2.3%

3.5%

3.0%

7.0%

5.4%

9.0%

France

2.9%

1.2%

0.3%

6.6%

3.7%

7.8%

Italy

3.8%

0.3%

1.8%

2.8%

2.6%

3.0%

Japan

2.0%

0,4%

1.3%

3.9%

4.5%

5.0%

Netherlands

0.7%

1.8%

1.3%

3.9%

5.4%

8.5%

United Kingdom

1.0%

1.9%

1.3%

3.9%

5.6%

7.1%

2.4%

4.2%

7.9%

11.0%

Sweden

1.9%

2.4%

Switzerland

0.8%

0.4%

2.1%

2.8%

5.3%

6.1%

US

1.0%

1.3%

1.9%

4.0%

6.6%

6.6%

Table 1: Real returns of financial assetsl4

Note that we do not observe the return of assets whose risk-free cash
flows mature in time horizons exceeding thirty years. The positivist approach
fails to provide any clear answer to the determination of the arbitrage-free
discount rate for those horizons. The arbitrage argument entails a reinvestment
13

Id.

14

Id.
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risk in that case. If we consider a project yielding risk-free cash flows in sixty
years, the natural arbitrage strategy would be to invest in a bond yielding a riskfree return in thirty years, and then to reinvest in another thirty-year bond at that
time. The problem is that we do not know today what the risk-free rate will be in
thirty years. How should we treat this source of uncertainty related to the
opportunity cost of capital? Posner and Weisbach follow a proposal by Martin
Weitzman"s to answer this question." They claim that when the interest rate r is
uncertain, a risk-free investment project entailing a sure cost 1 and a sure benefit
F, in t years should be implemented if and only if its expected net present value
(NPV) is positive, for example, if and only if -Io + E[F~e"] is positive."
Because the present value Fe' is decreasing and convex to the discount rate r,
this is equivalent to using a decision rule based on a "certainty equivalent"
discount rate R, that is smaller than the expected interest rate.' 8 I have shown
that this argument to reduce the discount rate has no scientific basis," because
even a risk-neutral investor would not use the expected NPV criterion to
evaluate risk-free projects when the interest rate is random. For example, such
an investor could use the alternative expected net future value (NFV) criterion in
such a way that a project would be said to be desirable if the expectation of its
NFV, -E[Ie-' + FJ, is positive. 20 This would yield the opposite policy
recommendation to raise the certainty equivalent discount rate under
uncertainty. The bottom line is that even positivists need to rely on ethical
principles when prices are not observable or when markets are incomplete. I will
come back to this point in the next section.
III. THE ETHICIST APPROACH
The Ramsey rule tells us that the intensity of this wealth effect is equal to
the product of the growth rate g of consumption by the degree, y, of relative
inequality aversion. This rule can easily be derived from the social welfare
function (SWF) described below. Consider a small sure investment project that
costs 1o per capita today and that generates a sure benefit F, at date t. Given that

16

Weitzman, 36 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 205-07 (cited in note 11) (arguing that the lowest possible
interest rate should be used for discounting the far-distant future part of any investment project).
Posner and Weisbach, Cmate ChangeJusice at 152 (cited in note 1).

17

Id.

18

19

More precisely, we can define the certainty equivalent discount rate R, in such a way that it is easy
to check from this definition that R, is a decreasing function of t.
Christian Gollier, Maximizng the Expected Net Future Value as an Alternative Stratep to Gamma

20

Discounting, 1 Fin Rsrch Let 85, 86-88 (2004).
Notice that the NPV and NFV criteria are strictly equivalent under certainty.

15
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consumption per capita is co and c, respectively at date 0 and t, investing in the
project raises the SWF if and only if
u(co) + u(ct),

u(co - 1o) + u(ct + FE)

(1)

Where u(c) is the utility generated by consuming c. Because the cash flows of the
investment are small, the above inequality holds if and only if
-lou'(co) + Ftu'(ct)

(2)

0.

This inequality can be rewritten as an NPV condition, -lo + Fe 1 ", where
the discount rate would be defined as follows:
e-rt

(3)

_ u'(ct)

The right-hand side of this equality is the IRMS. Now, suppose that
consumption grows at a constant rate g, so that c, = coe . Suppose also that the
elasticity of marginal utility to changes in consumption is a constanty, so that
u'(c) = c"'. Introducing these conditions into equation (3) implies that
e-rt

'(ct)

u' (CO)

= (coege)-Y

coY
0

=

e-ygt

(4)

so that r =yg, thereby proving the Ramsey rule.
Notice that parameter y is ethical. I hereafter use y = 2. This means that
one is ready to sacrifice as much as $4 from the rich to increase consumption of
the poor by $1, when the consumption of the rich is twice the consumption of
the poor. If one assumes that the average growth rate of consumption in the
future will be close to the one that has been observed in the Western World
since the Industrial Revolution, one should use g = 2%. This implies a socially
efficient discount rate of around 2 x 2% = 4%. Of course, this estimation is
sensitive to the selection of the parameters present in the Ramsey rule. The
lowest rate existing in the literature was obtained by Stern, who took g = 1.3%
andy = 1, yielding a discount rate of 1.3 percent.21
In reality, the Ramsey rule is useless because we do not know what the
growth rate of consumption will be in the future. Estimating the growth rate of

21

In fact, Stern uses 1.4 percent because he also takes into account of a 0.1 percent probability per
year that humanity will disappear. Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Retiew
181-89, 662-65 (Cambridge 2007).
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consumption just for the coming year is already a difficult task. Any estimate of
growth for the next decade is potentially subject to very large errors. Over a
century, estimation errors could be enormous. When the growth rate of
consumption is unknown, the intensity of the wealth effect cannot be estimated,
and the Ramsey rule is unable to produce a precise prescription for the choice of
discount rate. Uncertainty over how wealthy the future will be casts at least some
doubt on the relevance of the wealth effect to justify the use of a large discount
rate.
How should the Ramsey rule be adapted in an uncertain world?
Determining the optimal level of savings requires an estimate of the future utility
gain of this wealth transfer, in a context in which little is known about future
incomes. This problem is at the core of the question of what should be done for
the future. It is commonly accepted that individuals are ready to sacrifice more
in the present, to be used in the future, if the future becomes more uncertain.
John Maynard Keynes was the first to articulate this idea by pointing out the
precautionary motive for saving. What is desirable at the individual level is also
desirable at the collective one. A society that wants to reinforce the incentive to
invest for the future should select a smaller discount rate to evaluate the set of
all possible safe investment projects. Thus, ethicists should reduce their
estimation of the discount rate in the face of uncertain economic growth.
What is the intensity of this precautionary effect? If it is assumed that the
growth rate of consumption follows a random walk,23 I have shown that the
discount rate should be uniformly reduced by 0.5y(1+y)a 2 where a is the
volatility of the growth rate of consumption. 24 The observed volatility of
economic growth in the twentieth century in Western economies was around 4
percent. This yields a precautionary effect that reduces the discount rate by 0.48
percent. Combining the wealth effect and the precautionary effect yields a
discount rate of 3.5 percent.
However, various authors have argued that modelling uncertainty by a
random walk for the growth rate of consumption may be reasonable for shortterm horizons, but might vastly underestimate the long term uncertainty that our
planet faces. 2 5 The history of the western world before the Industrial Revolution
22

John M. Keynes, 1 A Treatise on Money 30-32 (Macmillan 1971).

23

See F. Russell Denton, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathemaics of Patent
Pdcing, 55 Rutgers L Rev 1175, 1200 (2003) (describing the random walk analysis in terms of an
object moving at random in any direction after each step); Gollier, Pricingthe Planet's Future at 4950 (cited in note 10) (explaining that growth rates that follow a random walk mean that past
growth does not give any information about future growth).
Christian Gollier, Time Hoi.on and the Discount Rate, 107 J Econ Theory 463, 466-72 (2002).

24
25

See, for example, Gollier, Pricing the Planet'sFuture at 61-73 (cited in note 10); Weitzman, Subjective
ExpectationsandAsset-Return PuZtles at 1121-22 (cited in note 11).
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is full of significant economic slumps, such as those occurring after the collapse
of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, or the Black Death epidemic in the
mid-fourteenth century. Some argue that the effects of improvements in
information technology have yet to be realized, and that the world is entering a
period of more rapid growth. By contrast, those who emphasize the effects of
natural resource scarcity, or the inability of financial markets to allocate capital
efficiently, predict lower growth rates in the future. Some even suggest a
negative GDP per capita growth, owing to a deterioration of the environment,
population growth, and a progressive deceleration of the productivity of capital
and labor. The implication of this last position is that the wealth effect on the
discount rate is negative rather than positive, as supposed by most experts.
Under these plausible beliefs, the future is poorer than the present so we should
make more sacrifices today to improve the future. This short discussion tells us
that our civilization faces uncertain future shocks that are likely to be persistent.
When shocks exhibit some degree of persistence, assuming a random walk for
the consumption growth rate underestimates the uncertainty affecting the level
of consumption enjoyed by future generations. Thus, this underestimates the
precautionary effect affecting the discount rate to be used for those very long
maturities.
I have modelled economic growth by considering various stochastic
processes with persistent shocks: 26 mean reversion processes, Markov regimeswitches, and Brownian processes with parametric uncertainty. These models
support a decreasing term structure for the discount rate, with a short-term rate
around 3.5 percent, and a discount rate for time horizons exceeding one or two
centuries between 1 percent and 2 percent. This decreasing structure biases the
evaluation of safe investment projects in favor of those that generate benefits in
the distant future.
In conclusion, ethicists base their evaluation of the discount rate on
collective preferences characterized by inequality aversion and prudence.
Inequality aversion justifies using a discount rate of around 4 percent per year.
The precautionary effect justifies reducing this rate by around 0.5 percent for
short maturities and by as much as 3 percent for much longer maturities.
IV. THE RISK-FREE RATE PUZZLE
Weil was the first to observe that the positivist and the ethicist positions
are difficult to reconcile, in the sense that the observed interest rates are much
smaller than the IRMS.27 Indeed, the real interest rate was between 1 percent and

26

Christian Gollier, Discountingnith Fat-tailedEconomic Growth, 37 J Risk & Uncertainty 171 (2008).

27

Weil, The Equiy Premium PuZle at 408-12 (cited in note 9).
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2 percent, whereas the IRMS for time horizons treated by financial markets (less
than thirty years) was estimated to be above 3.5 percent. In other words,
economists have a hard time explaining why people sacrificed much of their past
consumption to accumulate capital in a context of low interest rates and bright
economic prospects. From the ethicists' viewpoint, this intertemporal allocation
of consumption over the last century or so was vastly inefficient, because it
requires too much sacrifice from poorer old generations for the benefit of the
currently rich. For them, this could be justified only by the presence of a
sequence of extremely profitable short-term investment projects with a sure
return of at least 3.5 percent. This position is contradicted by the positivists'
observation that the interest rate, which reflects the rate of return for safe
capital, has been much smaller, around 1 percent or 2 percent. Ethicists would
postulate that one has invested too much in the past, and that one should
abstain from investing in all projects with returns between 2 percent and 3.5
percent. This sheds some light on the debate about the apparent short-termism
of financial markets. In fact, financial markets have been more long-termist than
one would have liked from the viewpoint of intergenerational welfare.
It is interesting to observe the reversal of attitude toward the discount rate
of the two approaches. Because positivists recommend a lower discount rate
than ethicists, the former are more favorable to sustainable development than
the latter, at least when evaluating projects maturing in less than thirty years.
Who is correct? To answer this question, consider an investment project with a
relatively short maturity rate that exhibits a sure 3 percent real rate of return.
Under the positivist approach, one should implement the project, whereas
ethicists would go against its implementation. My position on this is contingent
on the method in which the project is funded. If it is financed by a reallocation
of productive capital from a sector producing a return of 2 percent, there is no
doubt that the project should be implemented. If it is financed by a reduction in
the consumption of current generations, I would strongly reject this proposal. 28
However, this discussion is not really relevant for climate change, because
our actions to fight it will mature only in the distant future for which there is no
corresponding risk-free asset traded on the markets. As noted before, positivists
are not in a situation to make a recommendation for the rate at which long-term
benefits should be discounted. On their side, ethicists recommend a discount
rate that is smaller than 3.5 percent, and that is close to 1 percent to 2 percent, as

28

. Lawrence H. Goulder and Roberton C. Williams III, The Choice of Discount Ratefor Cmate Change
Pofig Evaluation *10--11 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18301, Aug
2012), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8301.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2012) (suggesting that
transferring resources to the future by consuming less now might not always lead to the most
efficient maximization of intertemporal social welfare).
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recommended by the positivists for short horizons. It is unclear whether
anything more than that can be said to compare the two positions, given the
non-applicability of the arbitrage argument used by the positivists in this context.
V. DISCOUNTING RISKY PROJECTS
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the risk premium
observed on financial markets for a specific risk profile should be proportional
to its financial beta (,), which measures the expected percentage increase in the
value of the project when the market value of the S&P 500 increases by 1
percent. In particular, marginal projects whose risks can be diversified away in
individual portfolios should not get any risk premium.2 9 They are actuarially
priced. That is, they should be implemented as soon as the discounted valuewith a rate of 2 percent of their expected cash flows-is non-negative. A project
with a risk profile f should be discounted at a rate equaling 2% + fX 4.6%.
The ethicist approach is based on estimating the impact of the additional
risk generated by the project on the well-being of future generations. Adding risk
to consumption is bad for future generations because they are risk-averse. This
risk aversion comes from the concavity of the utility function, which implies that
a given reduction in consumption has a larger impact on utility than its
equivalent increase. Consider, for example, an investment project whose risk
profile is identical to the uncertainty affecting aggregate consumption growth:
when the risk profile increases by 1 percent, so does the socioeconomic benefit
of the project. It is easy to verify that such a marginal investment project
increases intergenerational welfare if and only if the net present value of its flow
of expected benefits is positive, where the discount rate is adapted to the
riskiness of the project by adding a risk premium to the risk-free rate examined
in Section III of this paper.30 This risk premium is equal to ya ' where u is the
volatility of the growth rate of consumption. Using u = 4 % as before, this yields
a risk premium associated with the macroeconomic risk at around 0.32 percent.
Using a risk-free discount rate of 3.5 percent, this computation supports a
discount rate around 3.82 percent. The Consumption-based Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CCAPM) extends this methodology for other risk profiles.
Under the CCAPM, the risk profile of an investment is summarized by its
socioeconomic beta (f"), which measures the expected percentage increase in
the socioeconomic value of the project when aggregate consumption increases
by 1 percent. The socially efficient discount rate to be used for a project with a

29

30

Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluaion of Public Investment Dedsions, 60
Am Econ Rev 364, 372 (1970).
Gollier, Pridng the Planet'sFuture at 185-201 (cited in note 10).
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risk profile of r" is equal to 3.5% + f" x 0.32%.3 In particular, a risky project
whose benefits are not correlated to aggregate consumption should be
discounted at the risk-free rate discussed in Section III of this Article.
In order to compare the two positions, let us see how an ethicist would
evaluate a project whose risk profile is similar to the diversified portfolio of US
equities. The socioeconomic beta of the S&P 500 is estimated at fr = 1.72.
Thus, ethicists should use a discount rate of 3.5% + 1.72 x 0.32% = 4.05%.
This is in contrast to the 6.6 percent proposed by positivists to discount this
project. Because the equity premium of 4.6 percent observed during the
twentieth century is much smaller than the equity premium of 0.55 percent
estimated by the ethicists, we obtain a new reversal of the two positions with
respect to the valuation of the future: ethicists are more investment-prone than
positivists when projects are risky. This phenomenon corresponds to the wellknown "equity premium puzzle" first discovered by Rajnish Mehra and Edward
Prescott.3 2 During the twentieth century, markets compensated risk taking much
more than was socially efficient. Shareholding companies that undertook risky
projects incurred much larger costs of capital than safer firms. This implies that
much less risk was undertaken during the period than was desirable from the
viewpoint of intergenerational welfare.
Similarly, these observations hold for risky projects with relatively short
maturities. For larger maturities, both the risk-free discount rate and the
macroeconomic risk premium should be adapted. When the macroeconomic
risk is subject to persistent shocks, the term structure of the risk premium will
increase. In Pricing the Planet's Future, I recommended a macroeconomic risk
premium in the range of 1.5 percent and 3 percent for long horizons.3 3
Another important task is thus to determine the socioeconomic beta of
investment projects, whose main benefits come from reduced CO 2 emissions.
Estimating this parameter from market data is problematic, because these
benefits have not materialized yet. Because this will remain the case for many
years, we must thus again rely on a model. Some believe that the benefits from
reducing emissions will be the largest when economic growth is also large-that
is, when a large number of accumulated assets are under the peril of climate
change. Others believe the opposite. For them, the benefits from reducing
emissions will be the largest in scenarios where our civilization reverts back to
the Stone Age; the marginal utility of these benefits will be large when many
people will not starve thanks to these past efforts. The former should use a large
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discount rate for climate change (because of the large beta), whereas the latter
should use a much smaller discount rate for climate change that is potentially
smaller than the interest rate (because of the negative beta).
VI. CONCLUSION
Do we do enough for the future? If we consider the near future, we can
answer this question by examining the interest rate level in financial markets,
which represents the opportunity cost of capital. Positivists are perfectly right to
oppose transferring resources from productive capital in the economy to green
investment projects with socioeconomic returns less than the interest rate. That
would be bad news for future generations. On the other hand, ethicists are
concerned with the problem of whether the level of the interest rate is
compatible with intertemporal welfare. There are indeed many reasons to believe
that financial markets do not allocate resources efficiently through time. This
implies that there may exist at equilibrium unexploited transfers of consumption
that increase intertemporal welfare. Paradoxically, the so-called risk-free rate
puzzle tells us that ethicists are less prone to sacrifices for the future than
positivists. The Ramsey rule-which is the scientific basis used by ethiciststells us that the sacrifices made by poor past generations in terms of
accumulating capital were much too large compared to what would be desirable
in terms of intertemporal justice. Ethicists would recommend using a discount
rate larger than the interest rate observed on markets.
The interest rate observed in financial markets is the rate of return for riskfree capital. Any action that diverts some of this productive capital into a safe
investment project, whose return is smaller than the interest rate, destroys
wealth. If asked, future generations would reject this action. This arbitrage
argument provides a strong argument for using the interest rate as the rate to
discount risk-free investment projects.
If we are interested in very short-time horizons, bills are the relevant asset
class, and a discount rate not larger than 1 percent is relevant. Of course, this
rate should be flexible along the business cycle to take into account the cyclicity
of the opportunity cost of capital. If we are interested in risk-free cash flows
maturing in ten years, US bonds maturing at the same date are the relevant
benchmark asset to perform the arbitrage argument. A real discount rate around
2 percent is relevant in that case.
The point here is that positivists do not provide a satisfying answer with
regards to choosing a discount rate that corresponds to time horizons expressed
in decades and centuries, which are outside the scope of liquid financial markets.
To sum up, we see that the positivist position, which implies a discount
rate between 1 percent and 2 percent, depending upon the maturity and the
position in the business cycle, is limited by the problem of incomplete markets.
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We simply do not observe traded assets whose risk and time profiles fit those of
climate change. This implies that positivists need to complement their analysis
with ethical principles and economic models.
Ethicists consider another road to estimate the socially efficient discount
rate. Remember that the positivists' arbitrage argument relies on the assumption
that the investment project under scrutiny is financed through a reallocation of
productive capital. Under the positivist approach, no additional sacrifice is
requested on the side of current generations, because this reallocation is neutral
to their welfare. Thus, only future generations are impacted by this reallocation.
The ethicist approach is based on the alternative assumption that the new
project entails a reallocation of consumption through time, because the initial
implementation cost is financed by a corresponding reduction in current
consumption. Ethicists must thus compare the benefit for the future generation
to the cost borne by the current one, an exercise that involves interpersonal
comparisons of welfare. Their estimation of the discount rate is based on the
measurement of the IRMS between current and future consumption.
Together with Posner, Weisbach, and most ethicists, I reject weighing
utility changes differently for people of different generations. In other words, I
give no preference to the present. Ethicists value a transfer of consumption by
its impact on a SWF. With them, I assume that this SWF amounts to the
undiscounted sum of the flow of utility by the different generations. There are
several ways to interpret the SWF. The simplest approach assumes that the
current generation is altruistic and values the flow of future consumption as its
own consumption. Under that interpretation, the characteristics of the utility
function are the preferences of the current generation with respect to
intertemporal inequality. This interpretation is, of course, particularly relevant
for short time horizons. An alternative interpretation of the SWF is that it
represents our collective attitude toward the distribution of well-being across
generations. The concavity of the utility function expresses the aversion to
intergenerational inequality in that case. This interpretation of the SWF is
applicable for long time horizons. In any case, the concavity expresses an
aversion to consumption inequality.
Ethicists using the SWF described above usually recommend a positive
discount rate on the basis of the following wealth argument: in a growing
economy, future generations will be wealthier than we are. Because marginal
utility of wealth is decreasing, an additional unit of consumption in the future
has a smaller impact on the SWF than an additional unit of consumption today.
Thus, one should depreciate changes in consumption that occur later in time.
The positive discount rate expresses this wealth effect. It is the minimum rate of
return of a safe investment project that compensates for the fact that
implementing it transfers consumption from the current poor to the future rich.
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In other words, it accounts for the increased intertemporal inequality that the
project generates.
Most real collective projects are not safe, and indeed, many of them are
very risky. This is particularly the case for those yielding cash flows in the distant
future. For example, the size of the damage associated with climate change is
vastly uncertain. How should this affect the way in which we discount the
reduction of these damages obtained from our green investments? In a highly
uncertain future, how do we value research and development yielding uncertain
distant benefits and costs, as is the case for genetically manipulated organisms or
space exploration? In a less abstract fashion, how do we compare the merits of
various investment projects that differ not only in their maturities, but also in
their degrees of riskiness? For example, should we invest in fighting malaria,
which has immediate and nearly certain benefits, or in new education and
transportation infrastructures in developing countries, which have more distant
and uncertain benefits?
The positivists and the ethicists have different strategies to answer these
questions. Let us first examine the solution provided by the positivists for
relatively short time horizons. Extending the arbitrage argument presented in
Section II to risky projects, one should discount the flow of future expected
benefit at the market rate of return of an asset whose risk profile is identical to
one of the investment projects under evaluation. Those assets may not be easy
to identify. Let us consider a simple application of this arbitrage argument by
considering a project whose risk profile is identical to that of a diversified
portfolio of US stocks, for example, the S&P 500. If we rely on Table 1, the
expected benefits of this risky project should be discounted at a rate around 6.6
percent. This discount rate contains the risk-free interest rate of around 2
percent, and a risk premium of 4.6 percent. This gives an order of magnitude of
the impact of the riskiness of the project itself, on the rate at which it should be
discounted when using the positivist approach.
The problem of incomplete and inefficient financial markets is particularly
acute when considering longer time horizons. In particular, future generations
cannot trade on these markets, thereby raising more concerns about the
efficiency of the intertemporal allocation of resources. Moreover, one does not
observe liquid and safe assets with maturities longer than thirty years. This
implies that the positivist arbitrage argument cannot be used to determine the
efficient rate at which long-term investment projects should be discounted. The
determination of the efficient long-term discount rate should then rely on the
kind of models used by ethicists. The large uncertainties associated with the
well-being of distant generations justify using a decreasing term structure of the
discount rate. I recommend using a real discount rate between 1 percent and 2
percent for time horizons exceeding a century. This shows that we are not far
from reconciling ethicists' and positivists' positions.
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Finally, it is crucial to clarify that we are talking about the discount rate for
safe projects. Because green investment projects have highly uncertain distant
socioeconomic benefits, a risk premium should be added to the discount rate.
This risk premium should be proportional to the socioeconomic beta of these
green projects. It is a shame that the economic literature on climate change has
not yet addressed this question.
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